Liability for Transfusions of Hepatitis Infected Blood by unknown
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 2 Article 11
1971
Liability for Transfusions of Hepatitis Infected
Blood
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond
Law Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Liability for Transfusions of Hepatitis Infected Blood, 5 U. Rich. L. Rev. 364 (1971).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol5/iss2/11
COMMENTS
LIABILITY FOR TRANSFUSIONS OF HEPATITIS INFECTED
BLOOD
Legal resolution of the liability of a supplier of a useful and desirable
product which, in the present state of human skill and knowledge, is
unavoidably and necessarily dangerous to the user is fraught with difficulty.
A major portion of the law in this area revolves around cases of hepatitis
resulting from blood transfusions.1 The crucial problem encountered is the
nondetectibility of the hepatitis virus in the blood donor. Even though no
specific viral detection test has been perfected which can be applied prac-
tically to blood banking or plasma pooling, recent observations hold promise
for a more accurate method of detecting the asymptomatic carrier of the
virus. The impact of this new development cannot be adequately contem-
plated without an examination of the legal framework in which it must
operate.
Over a sixteen year period hepatitis cases have run the gamut from
nonliability of a hospital based upon an entrenched, but erroneous,
premise of warranty law, to strict liability. The leading case in the non-
liability area of the spectrum is Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital.2
Typical of most hepatitis cases where proof of negligence on the part
of a hospital or a blood bank is almost impossible to acquire,3 the plaintiff
had sued for breach of implied warranties for a particular purpose and
merchantibility. The court dismissed the action on the theory that a blood
transfusion was not a sale under the then existing New York Sales Act,
but was an incidental feature of a service (treatment),' hence no war-
' It is estimated that two to three per cent of the adults in the United States are
carriers of the serum hepatitis virus and that blood transfusions are associated with
30,000 cases of the disease a year. Of these cases, more than 1500 are thought to
result in death. Richmond Times Dispatch, Oct. 30, 1970, § C, at 8, col. 1.
2 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
3 In cases involving negligence, the allegations were made in connection with the
screening of donors, not the failure to detect the hepatitis virus in the blood. See, e.g.,
Baptista v. Saint Barnabas Medical Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902 (Super. Ct.
1970); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct.
1967), rev'd and remanded, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969); Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp.,
60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Young v. Brooklyn Women's Hosp.,
54 Misc. 2d 645, 283 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Hubbell v. South Nassau Com-
munities Hosp., 46 Misc. 2d 847, 260 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (action directly
against donor).
4 The Perlmutter court stated that a transfusion of blood is not the same as supplying
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ranties attached. Overlooking earlier cases in the same jurisdiction which
implied warranties in non-sales situations' and supporting a service defini-
tion with non-warranty cases,6 the court was averse to holding a hospital
liable because the art of healing frequently requires a balancing of risks
and a label of fault could not be attached to the actions of the hospital.
Even though fault is not a prerequisite to warranty recovery and war-
ranties do attach in non-sales cases,7 the rule of Perlmutter is still followed
in many jurisdictions.' Several other states, however, have used a more
direct approach by exempting statutorily the sale of blood from implied
warranties of merchantibility and fitness.9
food at a restaurant because a sick person goes to a hospital for treatment while a
hungry one goes to a restaurant for food. It is interesting to speculate what the result
would have been if food served by the hospital kitchen had been involved. See
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MiNN. L. RFv.
791, 811 n.107 (1966); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases,
57 COLUm. L. Rav. 653, 662 (1957).
5 See, e.g., Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. Hart, 237 N.Y. 30, 142 N.E. 342 (1923);
Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 653,
662 (1957); 103 U. PA. L. REv. 833 (1955).
One recent case did not overlook the fact that warranties may attach in non-sales
cases. In Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970), a trial court
was held to have erred in sustaining a demurrer to a warranty action against a hospital
because of earlier Pennsylvania cases which implied warranties in non-sale cases. The
court followed analogously the reasoning of Russell v. Community Blood Bank,
185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), cert. discharged, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967),
in that a transfusion by a hospital was not a sale. However, the case was remanded
to build up a record on whether new tests have been developed to detect hepatitis.
The Russell court had recognized that nondetectibility may constitute a defense to
warranty liability if proven.
'G(Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv.
653, 662 (1957).
7 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313, Comment 2; L. FRUMER & M. FamxDAN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19.02 at 500 (1960); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties in Non-Sales
Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957); 103 U. PA. L. REv. 833, 834 (1955).
SSee Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Whitehurst v.
American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965); Lovett v. Emory
Univ., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War
Memorial Blood Bank, 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Goelz v. Wadley
Research Institute & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Dibblee v.
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 240, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961); Gile v.
Kennewick Public Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Koenig v.
Milwaukee Blood Center, 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
9 See ALAsKA STATS. ANN. § 45.05.100 (e) (1962); ARK. STATS. ANN. § 85-2-318(3) (d)
(1969); MAss. LAws AwN. ch. 106 § 2-316(5) (1966); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5)
(Cum. Supp. 1970); TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE § 2.316(e) (1967).
Other states, following the no-sale-no-warranty theory of Perlmutter, have enacted
statutes making the transfusion of blood a service and not a sale. See Amz. Rav. STATS.
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Several plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in their attempts to circumvent
the application of Perlmutter to their causes of action. In Krom v. Sharp &
Dohme,'° warranty liability of a blood bank was denied because the hos-
pital which administered the transfusion was not considered as a pur-
chasing agent of a patient." At least one court has refused to allow re-
covery on the theory of negligence per se due to an alleged violation
of a pure food and drug act because hepatitis contaminated blood is not
a "filthy" substance as required by the statute." In addition, New York
courts have limited the application of Perlmutter by holding its rule does
not apply to causes of action based upon the negligence of a blood bank 3
or upon the breach of an express warranty given by a hospital. 4
In the decade after Perlmutter courts were dogmatically following its
rule until the appellate judiciary of Florida, when confronted with a
hepatitis case' 5 for the first time, developed a new view which is at least
complementary, if not contradictory, to the New York position. Sig-
nificantly, the warranty action in Russell v. Community Blood Bank was
against a nonprofit blood bank which had sold contaminated blood
directly to the plaintiff even though she was in a hospital where it was
transfused. The District Court of Appeals held (1) that the transfer from
the blood bank to the plaintiff was a sale,' 6 and, therefore, implied war-
ANN. § 36-1151 (Cum. Supp. 1969); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (1963); FLA.
STATS. ANN. 5 672.2-316(5) (1969).
10 7 App. Div. 2d 761, 180 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1958).
"An unreported New York case, Heitner v. City of New York, New York Law
Journal, July 9, 1968, at 12, dismissed a cause of action based upon warranty against
a commerical blood bank because Krom had extended Perlmutter to such suppliers.
As an alternate ground of decision, the court felt the complaint should be dismissed
because there was no way the plaintiff could prove his claim (nondetectibiity of the
virus). However, Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup.
Ct. 1969), expresses a contrary view that Krom merely held that the hospital was not
the patient's agent and in warranty cases it is immaterial that there is a lack of
knowledge of defects or a means of detection or that negligence cannot be proven.
12 Merck & Co. v. Kidd, 242 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1957). See Note, Liability for the
Supplying of Impure Blood, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 374, 386.
13 Young v. Brooklyn Women's Hosp., 54 Misc. 2d 645, 283 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct.
1967).
14 Napoli v. St. Peter's Hosp., - Misc. 2d -, 213 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Supp. Ct. 1961).
15 Russell v. Community Blood Bank, 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), cert.
discharged, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
16 Other courts have reasoned that a transfer of blood from a supplier for a price
is a sale under the Uniform Commercial Code. See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hosp., 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp.,
96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct. 1967), rev'd and remanded, 53 N.J. 138,
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ranties attach; and (2) that the blood bank could be liable for breach of
warranty, but only if the virus was capable of detection and removal.
The burden was placed upon the supplier to prove that the virus was
incapable of detection and that blood was an "unavoidably unsafe
product."
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed that a cause of action in war-
ranty had been stated, but felt that the validity of nondetectibility as a
defense was in conflict with Green v. American Tobacco Co., and,
therefore, statements of the lower appellate court concerning the effect
of the ability or inability to remove the virus were surplusage and ex-
punged. The case was remanded" for trial on the question of detectibility,
but the court specifically refused to consider whether nondetectibility would
be a legal defense if proved. The effect of these decisions is to allow war-
ranty actions against blood banks, but not against hospitals.'
With the increasing vogue of strict products liability in the sixties,2"
it was inevitable that the question of imposing this doctrine on a hospital
or blood bank would be raised.2 In Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War
249 A.2d 65 (1969); Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
17 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964) (cigarette manufacturer
could be liable in warranty for lung cancer even if the danger in smoking could not
have been discovered by reasonable foresight).
1sthe Florida Supreme Court discharged certiorari, which caused the reverse and
remand ruling of the District Court of Appeals to become effective.
19 See White v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968); Hoder v. Sayer, 196 So.2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). Even a New York
court which dismissed an action against a hospital refused as a matter of law to do so
as to a blood bank, and allowed the case to go to trial so a record could be created
for later policy considerations. Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304
N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969). Therefore, New York appears to be leaning toward
adopting a rule similar to that of Florida.20 See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 IMI. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965); Citrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Heningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).2 1 Despite the large number of warranty liability cases which turn upon privity
considerations, only two hepatitis cases have been found to have involved the concept.
Russo v. Merck & Co., 138 F. Supp. 147 (D.R.I. 1956); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War
Memorial Blood Bank, 270 Min. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965). The Russo decision denied
liability because there was no privity, however later cases hold privity unnecessary
for a warranty to attach. See, e.g., Heningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d
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Memorial Blood Bank,22 the Minnesota court cursorily refused to apply
strict liability to a charitable activity which served a humane and public
health service. It remained for a New Jersey trial court to make the first
extended discussion of the possible application of the doctrine to hepatitis
cases.2" This Superior Court decision recognized that exemption from
warranty liability should be based upon policy considerations, not on the
basis of no-sale-no-warranty. Since strict liability and warranty causes
of action are the same, the policy considerations of a highly desirable
product attendant with a not unreasonable risk as opposed to an injured
plaintiff with an almost unbearable burden of proof must be considered.
On appeal the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed and remanded the
case for trial on all points in order that a complete record may be com-
piled for a proper determination as to the imposition of warranty or strict
liability.24
Following the same procedure as the New Jersey court, the Supreme
Court of Illinois, in light of its earlier decision adopting strict liability,25
remanded a hepatitis case for the compilation of a record.26 In doing so
the court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action and that the
blood was a product which can be the subject of a sale by any supplier.
Upon the subsequent appeal, the Illinois court did not hesitate to impose
strict liability upon a hospital that performed a transfusion of hepatitis
contaminated blood. Citing comment e to section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, whole human blood was considered by the court
to be a "product" in the same manner as other articles which are wholly
unchanged from their natural state and are distributed for human con-
sumption. The court was unable to accept the service-no-sale reasoning
of Perlmutter and felt that blood banks and hospitals were entities within
the distribution chain of the blood, hence the fact it was provided ancillary
592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963). The Balko'witsch case made it clear that recovery was not
being denied on the ground of lack of privity.
22 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965).
23 Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct. 1967),
rev'd and remanded, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
24 The action in this case was later dismissed under a stipulation dated June 29, 1969.
See Baptista v. Saint Barnabas Medical Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902, 906
n.1 (Super. Ct. 1970) (strict liability not applied where the blood transfused was neither
infected nor defective, but merely mismatched).
25 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
26 Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 NE.2d 733
(1969).27 Cunningham v. MacNeal Hosp., 39 U.S.L.W. 2200 (Sup. Ct. Ill. Sept. 29, 1970).
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to a service had no bearing. The nondetectibility of the virus was con-
sidered irrelevant because any other rule in the exercise of all possible
care in preparation and production would be inconsistent with the concept
of strict liability. The most important problem-whether blood is an
"unavoidably unsafe product" under comment k of section 402A of the
Restatement-was glossed over by the court, which stated that the com-
ment can be read only as relating to products that are not impure and,
even if properly prepared, inherently involve substantial risk of injury
to the user. Because it was alleged to have been impure, the transfused
blood was held not to fall under comment k.
Despite the skepticism of some authorities that strict liability would be
imposed in hepatitis infected blood transfusion cases,28 this landmark
Illinois case decision will undoubtedly open the door to the application
of the doctrine by other states. Even though New York has been termed
an "island of resistance," 2 its view as espoused in Perlmutter and as
modified by Russell remains overwhelming in the United States."0 Only
the passage of time will demonstrate whether courts, which are, for the
most part, reluctant to impose liability, will yield to the increasing tide
of strict liability.
The major reason for this reluctance is the fact that the presence of the
etiological factors in a donor's blood cannot be detected with any accu-
racy.3 Serum hepatitis,32 an inflammatory disease of the liver, is caused
28 See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REv. 791, 812 (1966); Note, Liability for the Supplying of Impure Blood, 1965 Wis.
L. REv. 374, 338; Note, Liability for Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42 MINN. L. REv. 640,
660 (1958).
29 Cunningham v. McNeal Hosp., 113 II. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733, 737 (1969).
3 0 See cases cited note 8 supra.
31See Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954);
L. FRu ER & M. FIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LLaumrry § 19.02[2], at 502.5 (1960); Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MiNN. L. REv. 791, 812
(1966).
One court has suggested that the most valid reason for denying liability is the
inability to avoid virus contamination. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227
A.2d 539 (Super. Ct. 1967).
32There are two basic varieties of hepatitis. The first is toxocological hepatitis
which is a liver injury caused by chemical agents introduced into the body or by
toxins of internal origin presumably present in certain diseases unconnected with the
liver. The other variety is viral hepatitis of which there are two types: infectious
hepatitis and serum (or homologous serum) hepatitis. See Prince, Hargrove, Szmuness,
Cherubin, Fontana & Jeffries, Immunologic Distinction between Infections and Serum
Hepatitis, 282 NEw ENG. J. MED. 987 (1970). Because the infectious hepatitis virus
can be neutralized by the protective antibodies in ordinary gamma globulin, victims of
hepatitis infected blood usually contract serum hepatitis.
19711
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by an exclusively manmade virus introduced through the skin when
human products, such as blood, are injected either therapeutically or
parenterally into the body." Major impediments to detectibility include
a present impossibility of isolating the virus for positive microscopic iden-
tification and a nontransmittance to laboratory animals because man is the
only acceptable host. 4
Despite the existence of various tests and storage procedures for the
detection and neutralization of the virus, such preventives are, at most,
minimally successful. At present the most effective means of avoiding
a transfusion of hepatitis infected blood is careful selection of donors."
However, a significant breakthrough was accomplished recently by the
chance observation that a certain antigen was found to be present in a
high percentage of certain diseases such as hepatitis."8 This antigen has
been called variously the Australia antigen (AA)," serum hepatitis anti-
gen, or hepatitis associated antigen (HAA). The close relation between
the presence of the antigen and of the presumable virus in the acute stages
of serum hepatitis, as emphasized by Dr. Alfred Prince of Cornell Medical
Center,3" has been confirmed by the work of a group headed by Dr. J. P.
Giles.3" In addition, Dr. Prince has developed an immunoelectroosmor-
phoresis test which can detect fifty to ninety per cent of AA carriers and
33 Prince, Hargrove, Szmuness, Cherubin, Fontana & Jeffries, Immunologic Distinction
between Infectious and Serun Hepatitis, 282 NEw ENG. J. MED. 987, 990 (1970); Koff &
Isselbacher, Changing Concepts in the Epidemiology of Viral Hepatitis, 278 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1371, 1380 (1968).
34 Bang, Genesis of Hepatitis, 281 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1190 (1969).
35 Haut & Alter, Blood Transfusions-Strict Liability?, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 557, 559
(1969).
36 Bang, Genesis of Hepatitis, 281 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1190, 1191 (1969).
37 In the course of studying human population genetics in the Pacific, a group of
doctors found, in the serum of an Australian aborigine, a factor that reacted immuni-
cologically with an antiserum from patients who had received many transfusions. This
factor was thus called the Australia antigen. See Blumberg, Gerstley & Hungerford,
A Serum Antigen (Australia Antigen) in Down's Syndrome, Leukemia, and Hepatitis,
66 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 924 (1967); Blumberg, Polymorphisms of the Serum Proteins
and the Development of Iso-Precipitins in Transfused Patients, 40 Bu.. N.Y. ACAD.
MED. 377 (1964).
38 Prince, An Antigen Detected in the Blood During the Incubation Period of Serum
Hepatitis, 60 PRocE-D. NAT'L ActA. Sci. 814 (1968). Doctor Prince discovered that
the Australia antigen is found very rarely in the serum of infectious hepatitis patients.
39 Giles, McCollum & Berndtson, Viral Hepatitis: Relation of Australia/SH Antigen
to the Willowbrook MS-2 Strain, 281 NEW ENG. J. MED. 119 (1969). See also
Schweitzer & Spears, Hepatitis-Associated Antigen (Australia Antigen) in Mother and
Infant, 283 NEw ENG. J. MED. 570 (1970).
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twenty-five to forty per cent of hepatitis virus carriers.4" The National
Research Council has determined that the incidence of serum hepatitis
among patients who receive blood containing the antigen is three to five
times as great as those who receive blood not containing the substance.4'
Testing for the presence of AA is at present the only promising test for
use in screening prospective blood donors.2 Even though the accuracy in
detecting hepatitis infected blood is not as effective as desirable, it is sub-
stantially better than before the relationship between the Australia antigen
and serum hepatitis was first observed.
In deciding a hepatitis case, a court must consider the availability and
success of present tests and other preventive procedures in order to deter-
mine whether a duty should be imposed on a blood bank or hospital to
utilize such measures; and, if such a duty exists, whether or not a blood
supplier is entitled to rely on the results thereof. The usefulness and neces-
sity of blood transfusions, which in many instances spell the difference
between life and death, is unquestioned. The crucial question is the
application of nondetectibility as a defense to negligence, warranty, or
strict liability.
Of course, a blood supplier who indiscriminately solicits or accepts
donors without any investigation of possible hepatitis history can, and
should, be subject to liability for negligence regardless of the detectibility
of the virus. The latter consideration becomes relevant when courts pro-
ceed into the realm of warranty and strict liability. Comment k of section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which exempts suppliers of
"unavoidably unsafe products" from such liability, contemplates useful
and desirable products which presently cannot be made safe. Despite the
"impure" reasoning of Cunningham, which in effect rejects comment k,
hepatitis infected blood is very much similar to the rabies vaccine in that
hopefully man will eventually develop a means of detecting and removing
the virus from the blood and the etiological agents of the dread side effects
from the Pasteur treatment. Until such an evolution, blood and the rabies
vaccine will remain "impure," but not "defective," and hence, should be
excluded from subjection to warranty coverage or strict liability in tort.43
40Prince & Burke, Serumz Hepatitis Antigen (SH): Rapid Detection by High Voltage
lmmunoelectroonnorphoresis, 169 ScmNcE 593 (1970). See also Prince, An Antigen
Detected in the Blood During the Incubation Period of Serumn Hepatitis, 60 PROCEED.
NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 814 (1968).
41 Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct. 30, 1970, § C, at 8, col. 1.
421d.
43 It is interesting to note that no court has specifically held that the mere presence of
1971]
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Even though nondetectibility of the virus represents the major argument
against such liability, other considerations add validity to such a determina-
tion. A basic factor in imposing strict liability is that the supplier is in a
better position to know and control the condition of his product. The
inability of any institution to detect or remove the hepatitis virus from
blood with any degree of medical certainty considerably weakens this tenet
of strict liability." The ability of the supplier better to absorb the loss than
the recipient runs counter to the rapidly increasing cost of medical care
and the likelihood of inflated prices for whole blood to insulate the sup-
pliers against possible judgments under implied warranty or strict liability.
Insurers would naturally be reluctant to issue liability coverage policies
where recovery thereunder could be based upon a defect no one could
detect. Even beyond these considerations, a distinction must be drawn
between ordinary commercial products, such as the untreated mushrooms
referred to by the Illinois court, and medical necessities such as blood. 5
Because of such factors as nondetectibility and exorbitant medical costs,
the determinative for the imposition of warranty or strict liability for trans-
fusions of hepatitis contaminated blood should be public policy. 6 In the
absence of provable negligence, nonliability ought to be the standard due
to the present state of human skill and knowledge in this area. Hopefully,
Illinois will eventually prove to be a mere "island" in the sea of decisions
rejecting the imposition of warranty or strict liability in hepatitis associated
blood transfusion cases.
J. H. C.
the hepatitis virus constitutes a breach of warranty. The Perlmutter court must have
assumed this because it stated that it was immaterial whether the virus was detectable or
not because the hospital would be liable if the giving of a transfusion was a sale. See
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1954). In addition,
food cases show that strict liability in warranty should be imposed whether or not the
defect could be eliminated. See, e.g., Holt v. Mann, 294 Mass. 21, 200 N.E. 403 (1936)(trichinosis). Logically this rule of wholesomeness and fitness for human consumption
could be applied to blood. However, this application must be considered in light of
the usefulness and desirability of blood for transfusions.
44 See Pollock, Liability of a Blood Bank or Hospital For a Hepatitis Associated Blood
Transfusion in New Jersey, 2 SETON HALL L. REv. 47, 53 (1970).
45 One case recognizes such a distinction. Newmark v. Gimbel's, 54 N.J. 585, 258
A.2d 697 (1969).46 See Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct.
1967), rev'd and remanded, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969); Carter v. Inter-Faith
Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp.,
439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970).
